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Thinking Like a Lawyer
Emily Calhoun
Every year, new students are welcomed to law school with the promise that
each student will be taught that most important of skills, to think like a
lawyer. The promise is troubling, for it suggests that the lawyer's thought
processes are significantly different from (and even superior to) those of
other professions, disciplines, or individuals. That suggestion is in error;
and, in conveying it, the promise constitutes an unnecessary impediment to
the productive study of law and perpetuates a myth harmful to the legal
profession.
In order to appreciate fully how the suggestion implicit in the promise
may interfere with or harm the study and practice of law, one must have
some idea of the nature of the thought processes that are utilized by and have
proved fruitful in other disciplines. Eloquent descriptions of the thought
processes of scientists have been provided in Jacob Bronowski's Origins of
Knowledge and Imagination' and in Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific
Revolutions.2 Those thought processes are almost universally respected and
valued, even by lawyers. They will, therefore, be the primary focus of this
article, although the discussion might equally well pertain to other
disciplines.3
Emily Calhoun is Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Jacob Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination (New Haven, Conn., 1978).
2. Thomas Kuhn, The Stucture of Scientific Revolution, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1970).
3. See, e.g., the discussion provided by John Gardner in On Becoming a Novelist (New York,
1983). According to Gardner, a novelist is a problem solver. To become one, an individual
must "learn how to think like a novelist. What he does not need is teacher who imposes his
own solution [to a story's problems], like an algebra teacher who tells you the answer
without showing how he got there, because it is a process thai the young writer must learn:
problems in novels.., have any number of solutions." Id. at 87-88. The novelist relies on
imagination or intuition, when he harnesses the "real process of our dreams." Id. at
60-61. He depends on an openness of vision, which is critical to imagination. He must have
a willingness to look at things "from every human-and inhuman-point of view.... He
must learn, by staring intently into the dream he dreams over his typewriter, to distinguish
the subtlest differences between the speech and feeling of his various characters ... giving
all human beings their due and acknowledging their frailties. Insofar as he pretends not to
private vision but to omniscience, he cannot as a rule, love some of his characters and
despise others." Id. at 30. The poet Wallace Stevens, in discussing the necessary tie between
reality and imagination in poetry, comments:
The pressure of reality... [may be] great enough and prolonged enough to bring about
the end of one era in the history of the imagination and, if so, then great enough to
bring about the beginning of another. It is one of ihe peculiarities of the imagination
that it is always at the end of an era. What happens is that it is always attaching itself to
a new reality, and adhering to it. It is not that there is a new imagination but that there
is a new reality. The pressure of reality may, of course, be described. It exists for
© 1984 by the Association of American Law Schools. Cite as 34 J. Legal Educ. 507 (1984).
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Bronowski begins his lectures with a discussion of inference. He contends
that "inferences are... at the root of all our mental processes."4 Even visual
perception depends on an inferential process. The eye, a rather uncompli-
cated biological mechanism, works with the brain so that coarsely perceived
sensations "are instantly interpreted by an inferential process." 5
The following excerpt from Bronowski's lectures explains how an
inferential framework enables sensations to produce fine discriminations in
sight.
[T~he eye does not form a continuous picture.... [I]f it is full of rods and cones and if
single photons of light activate them, then the thing must be jumping about like mad
with spots of light here and there. Moreover, ... a rod or cone ... must be rewound before
they can receive again. So we have a very coarse, grainy surface, which is rather like that of
old-fashioned newspaper photographs. In addition.... you cannot have an eyeful of over
a million of these units without some of them going off wrong....
Think of the sharp outline of this piece of paper.., and ask yourself if it is going to
appear sharp on an eye which is being triggered off by the rain of photons I described. The
answer is: of course not. There must be an extremely wavy edge of shadow against light in
my eye which somehow goes to the brain as a straight edge.... And the reason it does this
is because the eye is so wired up among rods and cones that it actually looks for straight
edges.
6
The inferential process that enables the eye and brain cooperatively to
interpret sensation is rather unusual. The eye's inferential framework is akin
to an inflexible, "built-in search mechanism.
' 7
Bronowski believes that the ability to imagine cannot be separated from
the visual apparatus.8 Moreover, for him, mental processes themselves are
dependent on an inferential framework. That framework defines the
problems which the scientist intends to solve. According to Bronowski,
it is ... an essential part of the methodology of science to divide the world for any
experiment into what we regard as relevant and what we regard, for purposes of that
experiment, as irrelevant. We make a cut.... Now I get a set of answers which I try to
decode in this context. And I am certainly not going to get the world right, because the
basic assumption that I have made about the world is in fact a lie .... [Wihen we practice
science. . . we are always decoding a part of nature which is not complete.9
Thus, the scientific "decoding" of nature begins with a simplifying and
distorting "cut," with the refinement of an inferential framework.
The inferential framework within which scientific decoding proceeds is
what Thomas Kuhn. terms a paradigm, or a shared and accepted set of
individuals according to the circumstances of their wills or according to the
characteristics of their minds.... [T]he pressure of reality is, I think, the determining
factor in the artistic character of an era and, as well, the determining factor in the
artistic character of an individual.
Wallace Stevens, The Necessary Angel 22-23 (New York, 1951). Compare these comments
with the discussion of the scientific thought process contained in the text of this article.
4. Bronowski, supra note 1, at 22.
5. Id. at 93.
6. Id. at 15-16.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 58-59.
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scientific values and principles.10 The activity of normal, or routine, science
cannot proceed without a shared paradigm." In fact, its objective, according
to Bronowski, is "an attempt to present a known world as a closed system
with a perfect formalism.
1 2
The activity of normal science, which requires a shared set of scientific
values and principles, is not the only activity of scientists. There is another
with a slightly different character. Kuhn identifies the activity as that which
produces scientific revolution."8 Bronowski refers to it as scientific discovery.
In Bronowski's words,
Scientific discovery is a constant maverick process of breaking out at the ends of the system
and opening it up again and then hastily closing it after you have done your particular
piece of work. ... The endless progress of science ... arises exactly from the fact that...
when you come on a profound discovery .... which is really essentially an inconsistency in
the system, then you reorganize the whole thing. And that reorganization is the central act
of the imagination. The act of imagination is the opening of the system so that it shows
new connections.... [E]very act of imagination is the discovery of likenesses between two
things which were thought unlike.
4
To illustrate his point, Bronowski uses anecdotes that purport to reveal
the thoughts of various scientists at the imaginative moment when the closed
system of science was breached and a reordering occurred. For example, he
attributes the following words to Wilhelm Olbers:
The sky is full of stars, and they are obviously pumping energy into space. Now we can
assume that the universe is reasonably old, and that therefore it has settled down to some
kind of state equilibrium. If that is so, then every object in the universe has reached a stage
at which the amount of energy that is being radiated to it from the stars must be exactly the
amount which it is radiating back.... It is very clear that if we go out into the night sky, it
should be as bright as daylight because there is all the energy in a state of equilibrium."-
The paradox embodied in this observation later became the basis of an
hypothesis set forth by another scientist, whose thoughts Bronowski also
traces:
We can say that there are three possible states for the universe: it might be contracting, it
might be of stationary size, or it might be expanding. If it is contracting, then night ought
to be brighter than day because there ought to be more energy coming in simply from the
background than the sun is actually supplying. If it is stationary, then night and day
ought to be equally bright. And if the universe is expanding, then night ought to be
dark. 16
The hypothesis that the universe is expanding was accepted only after many
years, when science was capable of providing an appropriate methodology
for its verification.
The methodology of scientific discovery is, at its inception, highly
inferential in Bronowski's sense of the word: It is dependent on an
inferential framework. In this respect it is no different from the methodology
10. Kuhn, supra note 2, at 11, 24.
11. Id.
12. Bronowski, supra note 1, at 108.
13. See generally, Kuhn, supra note 2.
14. Bronowski, supra note 1, at 108-09.
15. Id. at 50.
16. Id. at 51.
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of normal science. There is, however, a critical distinction between the two.
Normal science solves puzzles defined by the inferential framework of an
accepted scientific paradigm. Scientific discovery replaces the accepted
inferential framework with a new one. It sees not a puzzle that can be solved
with reference to existing scientific paradigms but an anomaly that requires
a restructuring of scientific models.'
7
Unlike the eye's inferential framework, which interprets the world in
terms of a "built-in search mechanism" and does not "look at nature with a
fresh, open vision,"' 8 the scientist's inferential framework may change in
significant ways. Changes, when they occur, are likely to be "highly
imaginative" or intuitive. 19
Although much of a scientist's time and energy is undoubtedly expended
in applying scientific methods of verification to hypotheses, a task indis-
pensable to normal science and to the science of discovery, the methodology
of verification would be useless without the inferences that lead to the
hypotheses. The inferential framework enables the scientist to see unexpected
or unconventional patterns and relationships between components of a
system, to find a way of accommodating troublesome data or phenomena
through redefinition of a preexisting paradigm, and, generally, to function
as a scientist. Without that framework, the scientist could neither propose
more complete solutions to puzzles nor envision new scientific paradigms.
Lawyers do not'analyze a problem differently from scientists. They, like
the scientists described by Bronowski and Kuhn, have never doubted that
they are solvers of puzzles. To a lesser extent, perhaps, they have even
acknowledged their role as discoverers. They have not, however, fully
appreciated the importance of inference and intuition to these roles.
Intuition, that progenitor of new inferential frameworks, is rarely
identified or exploited as an invaluable component of legal analysis. It is
most frequently simply tolerated when it appears in the form of a student's
"gut reaction." A gut reaction may find itself incorporated into class
discussion, but only at the reluctant sufferance of the professor. Were
intuition ceded its rightful place as an important component of thinking
like a lawyer, as it is an important component of all human thought, a new
dimension would be added to legal education.
How acceptance of intuition as a legitimate component of legal analysis
could affect legal education is suggested by Kuhn's discussion of the
educational process that trains individuals to become scientists. In Kuhn's
17. Kuhn, supra note 2, at 59, 79.
18. Bronowski, supra note 1, at 18.
19. Id. at 69-70. Bronowski speaks of imagination and inference. This article refers to intuition
as characteristic of the act of imagination because it denotes "immediate apprehension" or
"the ability to perceive or know things without conscious reasoning," Webster's New World
Dictionary of the American Language (2d ed.), and, therefore, describes the imaginative
phenomenon as we frequently experience it. It is what produces hunches. Kuhn's references
both to the transformation of vision lying at the heart of a scientific revolution and to the
"tacit knowledge" of an accepted scientific paradigm, Kuhn at 191, reflect this aspect of the
imaginative process. See text accompanying notes 20-22, infra. This article also uses the
word intuition because it would probably be that most frequently (and somewhat
pejoratively) used by law students to describe the exercise of imagination in a law school
environment.
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opinion, the student becomes "an inhabitant of the scientist's world, seeing
what the scientist sees and responding as the scientist does," only after a
"transformation of vision." 20 When a student "views the situations that
confront him as a scientist in the same gestalt as other members of his
specialists' group" and has "assimilated a time-tested and group-licensed
way of seeing," 21 he has acquired a set of intuitions that are the "shared
possessions" of scientists."
22
That shared set of intuitions, however, is limiting. Kuhn argues that a
paradigm is usually accepted because it is successful in solving a set of
problems which the members of the profession believe to be especially
important.23 It does not necessarily address all important problems. As Kuhn
notes:
[O]ne of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion of
choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have
solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as
scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems . . .are rejected as
metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to
be worth the time. A paradigm can, for that matter, even insulate the community from
those socially important problems that are not reducible to the puzzle form, because they
cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm
supplies.
2 4
If one substitutes the legal for the scientific community described by
Kuhn, his description accurately reflects what happens when an intuitional
challenge to a legal paradigm is made in a law class. A satisfactory paradigm
debate rarely occurs because the debate is usually "rejected as metaphysical,
as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to
be worth the time."
25
Contemporary legal education obscures the intuitional bases for the
institutional and substantive paradigms of the law. It does not, therefore,
adequately cope with argument that challenges those paradigms from an
intuitional standpoint. Argument that addresses the validity of a legal
paradigm differs from the argument or puzzle solving that rests, for the most
part, on a "time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing." 26 As Kuhn notes,
"paradigm debates always involve the question: Which problems is it more
significant to have solved?" 27 This is a question of values.
28
20. Kuhn, supra note 2, at 111.
21. Id. at 189.
22. Id. at 191. Perhaps this is why, Kuhn argues
almost always the men who achieve ... fundamental inventions of a new paradigm
have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change....
[O]bviously these are the men who, being little committed by prior practice to the
traditional rules of normal science are particularly likely to see that those rules no
longer define a playable game and to conceive another set that can replace them.
Id, at 90.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Id. at 37.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 189.
27. Id. at 110.
28. Id.
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The intuition that perceives a different set of problems than that which is
encompassed by an existing paradigm is rooted in value. The participants in
a law class, however, are frequently unwilling to come to terms with the
nature of the debate. It is almost impossible to convince them that personal
neutrality is not necessary to scholarly objectivity. The former is confused
with and substituted for the latter. Thus, any paradigm argument, which by
definition invokes personal perspectives and values, becomes suspect.
29
The debate, as it is conducted in law classes, is rarely satisfactory for
another reason. Even those individuals who perceive that a paradigm debate
is legitimately a debate over values attempt to conduct that debate using the
argumentative methodology of the challenged paradigm. The debate is,
therefore, sure to be unsatisfactory. In Kuhn's words:
the choice... between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible
modes of community life. Because it has that character, the choice is not and cannot be
determined merely by the evaluative procedures characteristic of... a particular paradigm
... [when] that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate
about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular.
[T]he status of the circular argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot be made
logically or even probabilisticaly compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle.
The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate over paradigms are not
sufficiently extensive for that. As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice-there is
no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community.30
Perhaps because of this characteristic of the debate law professors are
impatient with it in class. It seems irresolvable except through "persuasion"
and, thus, largely a waste of time. The refusal to entertain the debate,
however, results in a failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of a debate that
turns on values. That form of debate occurs frequently within the legal
system, and lawyers ought to recognize and be prepared to contend with it.
Argument to a jury frequently takes this form. The genius of a trial lawyer
lies in knowing when to appeal to logic and when to appeal to value or
unprovable intuition.31 An appeal to value may also be made to courts, on
points of law. Anyone familiar with the arguments in such important voting
rights cases as Reynolds v. Sims3 2 or in such abstention cases as Younger v.
Harris,33 for example, cannot fail to discern the appeal to value. Similarly,
one cannot fail to discern in these arguments the usual response to an appeal
to value. That response is an insistent reminder of and reliance on
institutional rules that are inextricably tied to the challenged paradigm. As
29. Scholars identified with the Critical Legal Studies Movement have understandably objected
to this confusion. They are engaged in a paradigm debate and find it necessary to confront
the criticism that their scholarship is biased. See, e.g., David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law
(New York, 1983).
30. Id. at 94.
31. See, e.g., the jury speeches in Clarence Seward Darrow, Attorney for the Damned (New
York, 1957).
32. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
33. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Kuhn observes, "deep debates over legitimate methods, problems, and
standards of solution" arise "whenever paradigms or models are felt to be
insecure."
3 4
Even if one believes that a judicial system ought not to entertain paradigm
debates, one must acknowledge that they do occur. If legal education is to be
complete, students should at least be made aware of the possibility of making
a successful challenge to a legal paradigm and of the probable form such an
argument will take. The student might learn when to reject the logic of
precedent for the simplifying metaphor as a device for illuminating
intuition or explaining value. Ways of relying on shared experience or of
vicariously drawing a judge into an experience that he or she has not shared
might be explored. It would also be a useful exercise to attempt to
demonstrate to students how the methodologies of analysis themselves may
change as a direct result of the acceptance of a new legal paradigm. They are
part and parcel of the consequences of a paradigm change which ought to be
evaluated in the course of a paradigm debate.
Although intuition and argumentation strategies that implicitly acknowl-
edge its existence are occasionally addressed in law schools, they are not
emphasized. When law professors speak of thinking like a lawyer, they never
differentiate between, yet stress the equal importance of, intuition and logic.
Recognition of the role of intuition would significantly alter the educa-
tional experience for law students and law professors. Students suffer
because of the failure of their professors to explain the importance of
intuition to legal analysis. Frustration or hostility must be engendered in
those students who endeavor to eliminate non-neutral intuition from their
thought processes. Those students have embarked on a task that is physically
impossible. They never fully appreciate the power of, or learn to make
appropriate use of, intuition in legal analysis. They see no reason to
cultivate the broad base of experience and knowledge which inform
intuition and enhance one's ability to see the law in a new light, from a new
perspective.3 5 They spend a lot of time trying to learn to live happily and
productively only within a closed system. In other words, they never fully
experience the excitement of law.
There are other consequences of the failure to acknowledge the importance
of intuition in legal analysis which are perhaps more significant than those
which simply make the educational environment a stultifying one. Students
who are taught that intuition and value are, at best, suspect adjuncts to legal
reasoning have no understanding of the difference between neutrality and
objectivity. They mistakenly cultivate the former as a necessary or an
34. Kuhn, supra note 2, at 47-48. Comer Vann Woodard, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3d
rev. ed. (New York, 1974) illustrates this point well. Jim Crow laws mandating racial
segregation were unnecessary to the antebellum South because the community shared a
certain set of values. Only after the Civil War, when those values were in a state of challenge,
did the southern legislatures feel compelled to enact into law specific statutory standards of
conduct to reinforce the challenged social paradigm.
35. It should be emphasized that intuition becomes a potent analytical tool only to the extent
that it is a product of a broad base of experience and knowledge and to the extent that its
roots in experience and knowledge are recognized.
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accepted professional virtue. One may ask whether the law is not too potent
a tool to be entrusted to a profession that adheres to that virtue. One may also
ask the more metaphysical question of whether a person, encouraged neither
to appreciate nor to make full use of what most human beings cherish as an
enriching and individual trait, will function responsibly within a human
society.
36
Every profession perceives itself to be uniquely superior in some way, if
not by virtue of a particular analytical method then because of its world view
or the nature of the services it performs. Paradoxically, the legal profession
claims a superiority, rooted in its method of thinking and implicit rejection
of intuition, which inhibits education for membership in the profession.
When law professors speak of thinking like a lawyer, they should emphasize
that they are speaking not only of that rigorous process of verification which
is performed in the language of lawyers and which takes place within the
framework of existing legal institutions, but also of the intuitive process
which conceives of alternatives to existing institutions. One may acknowl-
edge that the former process requires important skills which must be taught
in a professional school without denying that the latter, intuitive process is
of equal importance and is equally susceptible of development and
refinement through educational institutions.
36. Bronowski, supra note 1, at 117-38, offers some'reflections on this question.
